

Message Text

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12

ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-12 ADP-00 SCI-06 AEC-11 AF-10

ARA-11 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01

GAC-01 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 /195 R

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EUR/ RPE: ALIEBOWITZ: PM/ DCA: LFUERTH

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AEC/ IP: WYEOMANS

ACDA/ GC: CVANDOREN

IO/ UNP: DBLACK

ACDA/ IR: AFNEIDLE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

INFO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 094850

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IT, EEC, IAEA, PARM

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DISTO

SUBJ: NPT RATIFICATION

REFS: (A) ROME 3563; (B) STATE 74831(NOTAL);

(C) ROME 3070

1. AS REPORTED REF A, ITALIAN FONOFF HAS DECIDED TO PREPARE IAEA- EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO PARLIAMENT BUT NOT TO SUBMIT NPT UNTIL SOME LATER DATE. DECISION WAS EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF PROBABILITY NPT WOULD ENCOUNTER OPPOSITION IN PARLIAMENT. BOTH DIRECTOR GENERAL DUCCI (IN CONVERSATION WITH ASST SEC STOESSEL, REF B) AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS IN FONOFF RELATED PROBLEM WITH PARLIAMENT TO INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR NPT AMONG OTHER MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. (QUESTION OF MEDITERRANEAN SUPPORT FOR NPT IS DEALT WITH BELOW.)

2. PRESENT FONOFF PLAN FOR HANDLING NPT RATIFICATION DIFFERS FROM EARLIER PREDICTION BY DEPUTY DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR (REF C) THAT GOI WOULD NOT INITIATE RATIFICATION PROCESS UNTIL CERTAIN " TECHNICAL QUESTIONS" INVOLVED IN EURATOM TREATY REGULATIONS SEVEN AND EIGHT WERE RESOLVED THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER EC PARTNERS. WHILE

REFERRING AGAIN TO NECESSITY OF RESOLVING QUESTIONS ARISING OUT OF REGULATIONS SEVEN AND EIGHT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR INDICATED PRESENT " BELIEF" THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAMPER RATIFICATION PROCESS. LATEST REPORT THAT FONOFF IS NOT PLANNING TO SUBMIT NPT UNTIL " LATER DATE" CONTRASTS WITH DUCCI' S REMARK THAT HE SUPPOSED NPT WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT SOON. ALL THIS MAY INDICATE SOME FLUX IN FONOFF APPROACH TO NPT RATIFICATION AND POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN SUBMISSION OF NPT FOR RATIFICATION, SINCE FONOFF HAS ONLY RECENTLY OPTED TO HOLD BACK TREATY SUBMISSION ON POLITICAL GROUNDS RATHER THAN ON GROUNDS THAT TECHNICAL ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST.

3. FONOFF DECISION CAUSES US CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN VIEW OF OUR STRONG INTEREST IN EARLY NPT RATIFICATION BY SIGNATORIES OF APRIL 5 IAEA- EURATOM AGREEMENT. AS ADDRESSEES ARE FULLY AWARE, US REMAINS POSSIBLE TARGET
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OF CHARGES OF VIOLATING NPT AS LONG AS IT CONTINUES TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR FUELS TO COUNTRIES NOT UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO EC RATIFICATION AS MEANS OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING NPT. CLEAR PROGRESS TOWARD RATIFICATION BY EC COULD HAVE POSITIVE IMPACT ON KEY NEAR- NUCLEARS SUCH AS JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA; BY SAME TOKEN, EVIDENCE OF ANY NEW OBSTACLES TO EC RATIFICATION COULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES IN THESE KEY COUNTRIES. AS EXPRESSED IN SECRETARY' S PRESS STATEMENT APRIL 6 (STATE 69815), THE US HOPES THAT THE SIGNING OF THE IAEA- EURATOM AGREEMENT OF APRIL 5 WILL LEAD TO PROMPT ADHERENCE TO THE NPT BY ALL OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. OTHERS DIRECTLY CONCERNED, INCLUDING BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, AND FRG APPEAR TO BELIEVE WAY NOW OPEN FOR INITIATING

RATIFICATION PROCESS.

4. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION ON SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE THAT BONN, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, AND LUXEMBOURG MAY HAVE ALREADY GLEANED FROM FONOFF CONTACTS, EC PARTNERS ARE PRESUMABLY GENERALLY AWARE OF DEVELOPING SITUATION IN GOI, AS INDICATED BY EXCHANGE BETWEEN DUTCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO CCD REPORTED GENEVA 1703, AND FRG FONOFF CONVERSATION REPORTED PARA 4 BONN 5711. ITALIANS MAY ALREADY HAVE APPROACHED

EC PARTNERS REGARDING TECHNICAL QUESTIONS OF REGULATIONS SEVEN AND EIGHT.

5. FOR ROME. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY MORE INFORMATION YOU CAN DEVELOP ON FONOFF PLANS RE NPT. DOES FONOFF DECISION REFLECT GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT PARLIAMENT OR ARE THERE OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED, FOR EXAMPLE, DESIRE FOR LEVERAGE WITH EC PARTNERS IN RESOLVING TECHNICAL QUESTIONS OF EURATOM REGULATIONS? IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES ALLUDED TO BY FONOFF OFFICIALS.

6. WE HAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN CREDITING
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SUGGESTION THAT KEY FACTOR IN ITALIAN DECISION TO PROCEED IS EXTENT OF RATIFICATIONS BY MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. AS MEMBER OF NATO, MUCH MORE RELEVANT FACTOR FOR ITALY IS EXTENT OF RATIFICATIONS BY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT. NATO MEMBERS PARTY TO NPT ARE UK, DENMARK, AND NORWAY IN ADDITION TO CANADA AND US. ALL WARSAW PACT MEMBERS HAVE RATIFIED NPT. ONLY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NOT SIGNED NPT ARE FRANCE, SPAIN, AND ALBANIA. ALL OTHERS THAT HAVE NOT YET RATIFIED APPEAR TO BE IN PROCESS OF DOING SO. IN ANY EVENT, AS MEMBER OF NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM, ITALY ENJOYS TREATY GUARANTEES IN PROTECTION OF ITS SECURITY WHICH, IN OUR JUDGMENT, FAR TRANSCEND CONSIDERATION OF NUMBER OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE SIGNED OR RATIFIED NPT.

7. WE WOULD THEREFORE FIND IT MOST SERIOUS MATTER IF GOI WERE TO DEVELOP POSITION THAT DESPITE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND VIABILITY OF WESTERN NUCLEAR DETERRENT, GOI COULD NOT PROCEED WITH STEPS TOWARD NPT RATIFICATION BECAUSE THERE HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES SIGNING OR RATIFYING NPT. IN THIS CONNECTION, EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK TO CORRECT MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR NPT AMONG ITALY'S NEIGHBORS. EIGHT MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES HAVE RATIFIED NPT TO DATE (CYPRUS, GREECE, LEBANON, MALTA, MOROCCO,

SYRIA, TUNISIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA); FOUR HAVE SIGNED BUT NOT YET RATIFIED (EGYPT, ITALY, LIBYA, AND TURKEY); FIVE HAVE NOT YET SIGNED (ALBANIA, ALGERIA, FRANCE, ISRAEL, AND SPAIN).

8. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM EMBASSY ON TIMING AND MANNER OF APPROACH IN WHICH WE MIGHT MOST EFFECTIVELY HEAD OFF ADOPTION OF THIS POSITION BY GOI, IF EMBASSY THINKS IT IS LIKELY THAT GOI WILL MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION.

9. FOR USEC: WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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TECHNICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REGULATIONS SEVEN AND EIGHT, REFERRED TO IN REFS A AND C. HOW WERE THESE QUESTIONS DEALT WITH IN EC DISCUSSIONS THAT LED TO MAN-DATE TO NEGOTIATE WITH IAEA? ARE THESE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO PRESENT SITUATION? WHAT ARE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT IMPEDING NPT RATIFICATION PROCESS? WHAT IS LIKELY TIME FRAME AND WHAT STEPS APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED IN RESOLVING THESE QUESTIONS? RUSH

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